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Love, Loss, and Identity in Solaris
Christopher Grau
Steven Soderbergh’s Solaris (2002) was a significant critical success: Salon described it as a “visually astonishing and thoroughly admirable new film”; 
the BBC declared it to be “one of the finest science fiction films since 2001: A 
Space Odyssey”; while the reviewer from Time Out claimed, “it’s probably the fin-
est, certainly the most stylish, sci-fi film in years . . . this is perhaps the most ambig-
uous and cerebrally sophisticated Hollywood movie in nearly three decades.” All 
this, despite the fact that the film inevitably competes with two classic works, each 
of which is often regarded as having the status of a sacred text: Stanislaw Lem’s 
1961 science fiction novel and Andrei Tarkovsky’s 1972 cinematic adaptation of 
that novel. Soderbergh managed, against the odds, to hold his own, with some 
reviewers even preferring his version over Tarkovsky’s or Lem’s.1 Nevertheless, 
Soderbergh’s film was a tough sell to general audiences. It was poorly marketed as 
a supernatural romance (à la Ghost), and viewers looking for the sort of action and 
effects that dominate contemporary science fiction films left the theater more 
than a little disappointed. Costing $47 million but bringing in only $15 million in 
domestic box office receipts, Solaris may eventually make money on DVD sales, 
but given than Amazon is currently selling the new DVD for a discounted price of 
five bucks, I suspect the executives at 20th Century Fox aren’t holding their breath.
1 In his review, Andrew Sarris remarks, “But I prefer Soderbergh’s concentration on his two lovers 
over Tarkovsky’s mostly male, mostly patriarchal debating societies. I have been suspicious for a 
long time of all the accolades bestowed by many of my colleagues on the work of Tarkovsky. Where 
they see greatness, I see only grandiosity, and a laborious, overlong grandiosity at that” (The New 
York Observer, December 15, 2002). The reviewer from Time Out proclaims, “Soderbergh’s movie 
beats its predecessor in virtually every respect. It’s not only richer and more rigorous, philosophi-
cally, than the Russian’s woolly musings, it also has an emotional force barely there in Tarkovsky” 
(http://www.timeout.com/film/74916.html). Writing in Film Threat (December 5, 2002), Rick 
Kisonak discusses both the 2002 film and the original novel and concludes, “It’s a gutsy move and I 
have to say I find Soderbergh’s ‘Solaris’ an eminently more satisfying experience than Lem’s.”
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Part of what has made the film both appealing to some and frustrating to 
most is its ambiguity. On first watch, it isn’t that clear just what is going on, and 
though the film richly rewards repeat viewings, the patience required for such 
efforts is significant. Here I want to offer an analysis of Solaris that focuses on 
questions regarding love and personal identity that are raised by the film.2 I’ll 
begin with a fairly detailed (but, given the complexity of this film, necessary) 
recounting of the narrative, and then consider the philosophical puzzles of 
attachment and identity that the film highlights. Still focusing on issues of iden-
tity, I’ll argue that the ending of the film is plausibly construed as disturbingly 
ambivalent. In the final section of the essay, I will consider a different take on 
the film, one inspired by the work of the philosopher Derek Parfit. A Parfitian 
philosophical framework allows for a significantly more uplifting vision of the 
film’s end, but (as we’ll see) this buoyancy comes at the cost of radically revising 
our attitudes toward identity and attachment.
The Story
The film begins with a shot of rain falling on a window pane,3 followed by Chris 
Kelvin (George Clooney) sitting pensively on his bed. In voice-over we hear a 
woman say, “Chris, what is it? I love you so much . . . Don’t you love me any-
more?” We then see him at work and infer that he is a therapist as we watch him 
engage with patients. Later, he returns home and prepares a salad, cutting his 
finger in the process.
Two officials arrive and present him with a video message from an old 
friend, Gibarian, who pleads that Kelvin needs to come to a space station 
orbiting the planet Solaris. Gibarian also suggests that, as a therapist, Kelvin is 
ideally situated to help out the crew as they attempt to deal with some as-yet-
unexplained crisis.4 We are then given our first glimpse of the bluish-purplish 
gaseous globe that is Solaris as we see Kelvin’s shuttle slowly dock with the 
space station.5
2 I don’t assume that my take on the film is an accurate reflection of all of Soderbergh’s inten-
tions. Soderbergh discusses some of his intentions on the DVD commentary track as well as in 
interviews. One particularly informative interview with Soderbergh and Clooney can be found 
at http://www.scifi.com/sfw/issue293/interview.html
3 I suspect the appearance of rain here (and later) is a subtle reference to Tarkovsky’s less subtle 
employment of rain in his version of Solaris.
4 Gibarian actually goes further, saying, “I hope you will come to Solaris, Chris, I think you need 
to . . . You will see what I mean,” suggesting that Gibarian believed Kelvin’s encounter with a “visi-
tor” of his own may be somehow therapeutic.
5 At this point Solaris is a bluish color. As the film progresses, we see the planet shift in color from 
blue to purple to red.
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Upon arrival at the station, Kelvin notices bloodstains and, eventually, the 
corpse of Gibarian.6 He then comes upon Snow, a crewmember who seems gen-
erally out of sorts and surprised to see Kelvin. Snow explains that the blood 
Kelvin saw belonged to Gutard, who was chased and killed by security forces. 
Snow also tells Kelvin that he is the one who discovered Gibarian’s death (a 
suicide). Kelvin, shocked, asks for an explanation. Snow responds cryptically, 
saying, “I could tell you what’s happening, but I don’t know if that would really 
tell you what’s happening.”
Kelvin seeks out the only other living member of the crew, Dr. Gordon.  Gordon, 
scared and unfriendly, insists Kelvin not enter her cabin. She refuses to explain the 
state of the ship, saying only, “Until it starts happening to you, there’s really no 
point in discussing it.” Kelvin then encounters a boy who quickly runs away. 
Returning to Snow, Kelvin is told that the boy is Gibarian’s son Michael. Wanting 
to know more, Kelvin requests a formal interview with both Snow and Gordon, 
and is mysteriously warned by Snow to lock his door before going to sleep.7
In the formal interview Gordon reveals she has been suffering from assorted 
psychiatric maladies. She doesn’t explain the situation on the ship, saying only: 
“Just that I want it to stop. But I want to stop it. If I can stop it, that means I’m 
smarter than it is.”8 Returning to his room, Kelvin listens to a recorded message 
from Gibarian in which he mocks the space program, saying, “We are proud of 
ourselves, but when you think about it, our enthusiasm is a sham. We don’t want 
other worlds—we want mirrors.”9
6 Here we get a brief shot of a bloodstain on the ceiling. Only toward the very end of the film will 
we come to learn the cause of this stain.
7 What Snow actually says is, “I find I sleep much better with the door locked.” He is presum-
ably trying to encourage Kelvin to lock his door and thus come to realize that his own “visitor” 
materializes within his quarters (and has not simply been hiding somewhere else on the ship). As 
we later learn, Snow (being a “visitor” himself ) presumably doesn’t actually have a need to lock 
his own door.
8 Gordon’s interview is followed by an exchange with Snow in which he claims, “I would kill to go 
back to Earth.” The irony of this statement won’t become apparent until it is eventually revealed 
that this version of Snow has in fact killed the original Snow.
9 The theme of mirroring is pervasive throughout Solaris. Gibarian’s remarks here are themselves 
mirrored by the comments of the dinner party guests in one of the flashback scenes. (Though 
they are discussing God, the ideas in circulation apply equally well to Solaris.) In addition, the 
suspicion of distortion through projection that comes up in the context of God/Solaris is close-
ly connected to the worry expressed by Gordon, Kelvin, and a Rheya visitor that perhaps Kel-
vin’s memories of Rheya are nothing more than a mirroring and projection of his own needs 
and wants. (In one heated exchange Gordon says to Kelvin, “She’s a mirror that reflects part of 
your mind. You provide the formula.”) The structure of the film also offers many points at which 
segments “mirror” each other (e.g., the Earth and “Earth” scenes, the first line of dialogue from 
Rheya and its later repetition, the suicide doubling [flashback and on ship], the doubling of sex 
on Earth with sex on the ship, etc.).
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Kelvin falls asleep, and we then get a flashback sequence (in much warmer 
amber tones, contrasting sharply with the bluish-gray shots aboard the ship) 
that begins with a shot of a woman holding a doorknob on the subway. We learn 
this is Rheya, a woman Kelvin soon meets again at a party and pursues. While 
he flirts with Rheya at the party, he talks to Gibarian about the planet Solaris 
and is told that that “the most interesting thing is, well, it seems to be reacting, 
almost like it knows it is being observed.” (This is said while we are presented 
with a shot of Rheya seductively walking off, clearly aware that she is being 
observed by Kelvin.) Kelvin continues to flirt with her, attempting to woo 
her with excerpts from a poem by Dylan Thomas: “And Death Shall Have No 
Dominion.”
In the next sequence we return to Kelvin sleeping on the ship and see an out-
of-focus figure coming up next to him. Eventually this figure is revealed to be 
Rheya. A montage follows with alternate shots of Kelvin and Rheya apparently 
making love on the ship and flashback scenes of both coupling on the night they 
met. The montage ends with a shot of Kelvin sleeping (clothed, thus revealing 
the ship sex scene we have just watched to be a dream), and a hand gently caresses 
his neck. Kelvin awakens and is immediately shocked by what he sees: Rheya 
appears to have materialized from his dreams. Wondering whether he is perhaps 
still asleep, Kelvin jumps out of bed, slaps himself, and paces anxiously. Eventu-
ally he gains some composure and he quizzes this “visitor” about where she 
thinks she is and who she thinks she is. Accurately describing their apartment 
back on Earth, as well as how they met, she seems to actually be Rheya, but 
Kelvin knows this is impossible.10 She then echoes the lines we first heard when 
the film began, saying, “Chris, I’m so happy to see you. I love you so much. 
Don’t you love me anymore?” These words, however, are delivered with a slightly 
uncanny expression on her face and a not-quite-human blink of her eyes.
Suitably distressed, Kelvin says he needs to talk to the crew and attempts to 
leave his cabin. Rheya2 immediately rushes to stop him. Shortly afterward we 
see Kelvin lure her into an escape pod and then, looking both confused and 
distraught, he ejects the pod into space in an effort to rid himself of this ghostly 
vision of his lost love.
Afterward he asks Snow, “What was that?” Typically, Snow isn’t forthcom-
ing. When asked where his own “visitor” is, Snow says, “I don’t know. Stopped 
appearing.” and claims the visitor was his brother. Kelvin reveals to Snow that 
his visitor was a copy of his dead wife, Rheya. Kelvin asks whether she will come 
back, and Snow responds, “Do you want her to?” Kelvin doesn’t answer, and his 
expression suggests that he isn’t sure what he wants at this point.
10 From this point on, I’ll refer to her as Rheya2, the next visitor as Rheya3, and so on.
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With suitcases piled high against his door to prevent entry, we see Kelvin 
attempt to fall asleep. This leads to another dream/flashback sequence in which 
we learn that Rheya was a psychologically troubled writer, that Kelvin repeat-
edly tried to convince her to marry him, and that she eventually accepted his 
proposal. We then cut back to Kelvin sleeping on the ship, and once again a 
hand lovingly caresses his neck. He turns and faces the new Rheya (Rheya3). 
There is an immediate cut to a postcoital shot of them both in bed undressed. 
(We infer a sex scene much like the one previously dreamed has now actually 
occurred on the ship.) Lounging in bed, she quizzes him about the cut on his 
finger, saying, “I don’t remember that. When did you get that?” This leads to an 
extended sequence in which she questions him about how she got there and 
reveals that she doesn’t remember much. Later, while Kelvin works at his desk, 
she gazes at Solaris and apparently has flashbacks/memories of purchasing a 
pregnancy kit, discovering she is pregnant, and arguing with Kelvin over her 
moodiness and lack of sociability.11
This flashback sequence culminates in memories of a dinner party in which 
the guests debate the idea of God. We learn that Kelvin has a coldly rationalistic 
vision of a purposeless universe while Rheya seems more open to some idea of a 
higher intelligence. Gibarian, grilling Rheya, accuses her of anthropomor-
phizing God: “You are ascribing human characteristics to something that isn’t 
human.” The theme throughout the conversation is the utter inscrutability of 
God. We see that Rheya isn’t particularly pleased with the vision of Kelvin’s (or 
his friends’) worldview that manifests in this discussion. There is a cut back to 
the space station where Rheya3 appears to be unhappily absorbing this informa-
tion. She confronts Kelvin:
rheya: Chris, I’ve got to talk to you.
kelvin: What’s wrong?
rheya: I don’t understand what’s happening. And if I do understand 
what’s happening, I don’t think I can handle it.
kelvin: What do you mean?
rheya: I mean . . . I mean . . . I’m not the person I remember.
Or, at least, I’m not sure I am. I mean I do remember things, but I don’t 
remember being there. I don’t remember experiencing those things.
11 While many of Rheya3’s “memories” that are shown to us via flashbacks could plausibly be de-
rived from Kelvin’s own memories, these shots of Rheya in the pharmacy and, later, responding to 
the pregnancy test are harder to explain, as Kelvin is clearly not present. We also later see another 
scene in which she, very much alone, commits suicide. Perhaps we are supposed to infer that these 
are based on Kelvin’s imaginings of what must have happened, or are instead Rheya3’s imaginings 
of those scenes. More likely (though perhaps stylistically inconsistent) we are being granted some-
thing closer to an omniscient point of view.
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[. . . Kelvin attempts to calm her and encourages her to take sleeping 
pills . . .]12
rheya: No, you don’t understand. Because I don’t think that I can live 
with this. I don’t understand what is happening now. And this, I 
remember this. I have a memory of it. But I don’t remember seeing 
it, I don’t remember being there.13
Rheya3 comes to realize that she is something like a copy of someone else, with 
memories that are borrowed from somewhere else. Kelvin, already aware that 
this Rheya is an imitation, has apparently gotten over his initial shock and 
decided to embrace this illusion: he seems eager to pacify her and prevent her 
from dwelling on the reality and oddity of the situation.
Kelvin seeks advice from Snow and warns him to never reveal to Rheya3 that 
the previous visitor Rheya2 was cast into space. In an apparent nonsequitur, Snow 
says, “I wonder if they can get pregnant?”14 This leads to a flashback/memory that 
both Kelvin and Rheya3 seem to experience simultaneously: alternating between 
shots of both of them (with Rheya3 staring out the window at Solaris), we see Kel-
vin and Rheya back on Earth arguing over her pregnancy and a subsequent abor-
tion. In the flashback, Kelvin yells, “You should have told me!” Rheya responds:
Chris, I had to. Obviously I had to. You know that about me. I had no 
idea you’d react like this. Listen. Listen. What’s changed? I didn’t even 
know you wanted one.
In a rage, Kelvin makes it abundantly clear that he did want one. He pushes her 
away, and when she claims, “Please, I won’t make it without you!” he responds, 
“Then you won’t make it!” and storms out.
12 In what may be a reference to The Matrix (a film that Soderbergh has said he admires) the sleep-
ing pills Kelvin foists on Rheya are blue, while the stimulants Kelvin will take later in an attempt 
to avoid sleep are red. (In The Matrix Neo is offered a choice between two pills: a red one that will 
cause him to “wake up” from an illusory world or a blue one that will put him to sleep.) In the end, 
however, the red pills in Solaris (combined with sleep deprivation) cause Kelvin hallucinations 
rather than accurate perception.
13 Tom Wartenberg has insightfully pointed out (in conversation) that Rheya’s description of her 
condition is in some ways similar to the phenomenology of watching a film. Rheya seems to ex-
perience visions and sounds playing in the “theatre of her mind” but lacks the conviction that she 
was really present when the experiences depicted actually occurred.
14 I say “apparent” here because, on reflection, the juxtaposition of the mention of the expulsion of 
Rheya2 with both Snow’s query regarding pregnancy and a flashback of Rheya and Kelvin arguing 
over her abortion is clearly intentional: the fact that Kelvin “aborts” Rheya2 against her will is bit-
terly ironic given that Rheya’s suicide was triggered by an argument over her receiving an abortion 
without Kelvin’s knowledge or consent.
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Cutting back to the station, we see Snow offer up Kelvin a plan for bringing 
Gordon and Rheya3 together to discuss what to do about Solaris. There is then 
another flashback to Rheya committing suicide while we hear the Dylan 
Thomas poem being read in voice-over by Kelvin. This is followed by a cut 
back to the ship and Rheya3 apparently taking in this information about “her” 
suicide and contemplating her situation. Somehow knowing that Kelvin dis-
covered the original Rheya’s dead body, Rheya3 asks him about it. Responding 
to Rheya3 as though she was the original, he says he came back for her, and 
apologizes.
A meeting between all four on ship occurs and they discuss the constitution of 
the “visitors.” It is suggested that they could be disintegrated through the proper 
machinery. Kelvin insists he wants to take Rheya3 back to Earth rather than have 
her destroyed by the proposed machine. This leads Gordon to quip, “Should we 
pick up the other one on the way?” Rheya3 gradually figures out that a previous 
incarnation of her has been forcibly evicted from the ship, and she reacts accord-
ingly, saying, “Oh my God. Oh my God. Don’t touch me!” to Kelvin.15 This 
exchange provokes Gordon to angrily warn Kelvin that he is mistaking an artifi-
cial projection for a genuine human being.
Later we see Kelvin sleeping, and in an apparent dream Gibarian visits him. 
Kelvin challenges this visitor, saying, “You’re not Gibarian.” Gibarian responds, 
“No. Who am I then? A puppet? And you’re not. Or maybe you’re my puppet? 
But like all puppets you think you are actually humans .  .  . It’s the puppet’s 
dream, being human.” Asked about his “son,” Gibarian answers, “That’s not my 
son. My son is on Earth. And that’s not your wife. They are part of Solaris, 
remember that.” Kelvin asks, “What does Solaris want from us?” and Gibarian 
replies, “Why do you think it has to want something? This is why you have to 
leave. If you keep thinking there is a solution, you’ll die here.” Kelvin says he 
can’t leave and that he will figure out a solution. Gibarian ends his visit with the 
proclamation: “There are no answers. Only choices.”
Kelvin awakens to discover Rheya3 missing. She has attempted to kill herself 
by drinking liquid oxygen. The attempt fails: in a deliberately unsettling scene 
we see her body “resurrect” and heal itself. Clearly disappointed that she has 
survived the suicide attempt, Rheya3 simply says, “Oh no!” and turns away from 
Kelvin. When he asks, “Why did you do that . . . Rheya?” She responds, “Don’t 
call me that,” and cries.
We then learn that Gordon has indeed constructed a device that will anni-
hilate visitors. Rheya3 expresses her desire to have the device used on her, lead-
ing to an exchange with Kelvin in which she questions her own reality and her 
15 For a brief discussion of the relevance of this line (and the role of touch generally), see note 20.
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capacity for free choice. Kelvin makes it clear that he needs her to help him 
have a chance to “undo that mistake” from his past. In tears, she begs him to let 
her go. Knowing that she will attempt to have the device used on her once he 
falls asleep, Kelvin takes a large number of red pills in an attempt to stay awake. 
This leads to a series of hallucinations: we see shots of him looking panicked 
and sweaty which alternate with shots of multiple Rheyas, Rheya3 speaking to 
Gibarian’s son, a damaged doorway, and other images of Kelvin groping along 
a hallway. This latter sequence is intercut with a flashback in which Kelvin dis-
covers the original Rheya’s dead body back on Earth. We see that he finds the 
dead Rheya holding a page ripped from a book containing the Dylan Thomas 
poem.
Kelvin wakes up from this delusional sleep and finds another “suicide note” 
of sorts: Rheya3 has recorded a video message explaining to Kelvin that she 
asked Gordon to destroy her. She says:
I realized I’m not her. I’m not Rheya, I know you loved me, though. And I 
love you. I wish we could just live inside that feeling forever. Maybe there’s 
a place where we can, but I know it is not on Earth and not on this ship.
Kelvin finds Gordon, argues with her, and in the process both discover blood 
stains on the ceiling. Investigating, they uncover the frozen corpse of Snow. 
Realizing that the Snow they have been dealing with must in fact be a “visitor,” 
they confront him, and he claims he had to kill the original Snow in self-defense. 
Before they can dwell on how to deal with this twist, Snow2 reveals to them that 
Solaris appears to be growing and they don’t have long to escape. We then see 
Kelvin and Gordon make preparations to leave.
There is a transition to a shot of a rainy window exactly similar to the one we 
saw in the very first shot of the film. This is followed by other familiar shots of 
Kelvin on a bed, in the street, on the train, and walking up stairs in the rain to 
his home. We hear him talking in voice-over—he comments on the oddity of 
being back and the difficulty to readjusting. We then see him back in his apart-
ment preparing a salad, just as he did at the beginning of the film. (One notable 
difference is that his refrigerator now has a picture of Rheya on it.16) He cuts his 
finger as he did at the beginning of the film, but this time the cut seems to heal 
itself instantaneously as he runs it under water. Looking dazed and puzzled, he 
glances at the photo of Rheya.
16 When Rheya2 was asked by Kelvin to describe their apartment, she commented, “And there are 
no paintings on the walls—no pictures anywhere—no pictures on the fridge even, which I always 
thought was a bit strange.”
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The film then cuts back to the station as Solaris advances toward it and we see 
that Kelvin chose not to accompany Gordon in the pod.17 Staying behind, we see 
him groan and collapse while the station loses power and become enveloped by 
Solaris. Snow2 is also there and seems to possess a look of rapture as he gazes at 
Solaris’s approach. Gibarian’s son Michael2 walks up to the collapsed Kelvin and, 
though barely conscious at this point, Kelvin manages to slowly reach out and 
touch his hand in a gesture that resembles Michelangelo’s The Creation of Adam.
There is a cut back to the photo of Rheya on the refrigerator in Kelvin’s 
apartment. While Kelvin stares at the photo, he hears Rheya call to him; he 
turns, surprised and confused to see her. He walks toward her and asks, “Am I 
alive . . . or dead?” She responds:
17 At just this point there is a curious sequence in the station corridor in which we see him repeat-
edly “doubled” on screen (one image of him fades out while simultaneously another fades in). 
This seems to hint at the interpretive decision demanded of the viewer here (as to whether we 
think he stayed on board or returned to Earth with Gordon). (Thanks to George Wilson for 
pointing out the relevance of this scene.)
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We don’t have to think like that anymore.
We’re together now. Everything we’ve done is forgiven. Everything.
They kiss and embrace. She is smiling and seems at peace; his face is harder to 
read: he looks exhausted, teary-eyed, and perhaps happy. The film ends with 
receding shots of Solaris.
Identity, Attachment, and Solaris
The sci-fi premise of Solaris allows Steven Soderbergh to tell a distinctly philo-
sophical love story. The “visitors” present us with a vivid thought experiment 
and the film effectively prods us to dwell on the possibility it illustrates. If con-
fronted with a near duplicate of someone you have loved and lost, what would 
your response be? What should your response be? The dramatic force of this 
premise derives from the fact that the tensions raised by such a far-fetched situ-
ation reflect tensions that can exist in real life between an attraction to qualities 
possessed by a person and attraction to the person in a manner that seems to 
transcend an attraction to qualities. In short, the premise of the film challenges 
us to reflect on what we really attach to when we fall in love: do we really love 
the person, or is it just the cluster of qualities the person happens to manifest and 
that could (possibly) be found in another? Philosophers have commented on 
this topic, and one particularly clear statement of the issue was offered by Rob-
ert Nozick:
Apparently, love is an interesting instance of another relationship that is 
historical, in that (like justice) it depends upon what actually occurred. 
An adult may come to love another because of the other’s characteristics; 
but it is the other person, and not the characteristics, that is loved. The 
love is not transferable to someone else with the same characteristics, 
even to one who “scores” higher for these characteristics. And the love 
endures through changes of the characteristics that gave rise to it. One 
loves the particular person one actually encountered. Why love is his-
torical, attaching to persons in this way and not to characteristics, is an 
interesting and puzzling question.18
As Nozick notes, love’s bond, though frequently beginning in an attachment 
to qualities, doesn’t always end there. A deep love for another person often involves 
an attachment that cannot be reduced without remainder to an attachment to the 
18 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 167–168.
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qualities of the beloved. The beloved is, in an important sense, irreplaceable.19 Of 
course, even those of us who affirm this sort of bond as a model of love should 
admit that another form of attachment is both possible and often tempting: an 
attachment that remains at the level of qualities; qualities that could (in theory at 
least) be repeated in another. How could the difference between these two sorts 
of attachment manifest itself ? Well, in ordinary life, it might not, as qualities we 
love are often multiple and complex and we don’t usually find them presented to 
us in more than one instantiation. In certain crude cases we can witness the dis-
tinction, however. To take a perhaps too-crude example: a person who is primarily 
attracted to, say, the blonde hair and biting wit of the beloved may well be willing 
to accept a substitute, so long as the substitute possesses those desired qualities.
Such a person may well be accused of being “superficial”; however, this 
charge of superficiality can have multiple sources: some may object that the per-
son simply values too simple a collection of qualities, while others may be object-
ing that it is the attachment to qualities themselves rather than the person 
exhibiting the qualities that is the objectionable feature of the attachment. It is 
the latter sort of complaint that is particularly interesting, philosophically, and 
the nice thing about the cinematic thought experiment we get in Solaris is that 
it allows us to contemplate and reflect on this question regarding the focus 
of one’s attachment. Through the film’s presentation of a fictional scenario in 
which a duplicate (manifesting many, if not all, of the qualities of the original) 
is created, we can see the protagonist struggle with his own attitudes regarding 
what sort of bond is appropriate.
At the beginning of the film, Kelvin is a man still in mourning over the sui-
cide of his wife, Rheya. He seems to feel both deep love for her and deep regret, 
as he knows her suicide was triggered by his own actions. When he travels to the 
space station and Solaris offers up “visitors” that are strikingly similar to his late 
wife, his response is complicated. He goes from shock, to rejection, to accep-
tance, most of the time manifesting what seems to be an appropriate level of 
confusion given the bizarre situation in which he finds himself. Kelvin’s shifting 
reactions at encountering this unusual scenario are gripping because they track 
19 Elsewhere (“Irreplaceability and Unique Value,” Philosophical Topics 32: 111–129) I discuss this 
issue in the context of “The Missyplicity Project,” a now defunct research program at the Uni-
versity of Texas to clone a particular dog funded by the wealthy owners of that dog. Finding 
the plan deeply creepy, I tried to explore what, exactly, is going on when we occasionally find 
ourselves drawn to attaching to the “type” rather than the “token” of that type. In a more recent 
article (“Love and History,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 48, no. 3) I attempt a provisional 
philosophical defense of the sort of token-directed attachment that many naturally feel is ap-
propriate in love relationships. Here my goals are different: I won’t offer a thorough defense that 
love directed at an individual is metaphysically coherent and ethically preferable to love directed 
at qualities. What I want to focus on instead are the conflicts that can arise from both sorts of at-
traction, and the way in which Solaris exploits this tension for dramatic effect.
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our own ambivalence about such matters. Frankly, most of us don’t know just 
how we would react to such a situation. The thought that accepting and embrac-
ing such a “visitor” involves a violation to the original person is natural and 
pervasive, especially if the acceptance of the copy comes with a failure to 
acknowledge the distinct identities of the two persons. At the same time, a deep 
attraction to such a visitor would surely also be entirely natural and perhaps 
even inescapable.20 As viewers we are, like Kelvin, torn in different directions by 
this (perhaps thankfully) far-fetched possibility.
Once Kelvin’s initial shock and confusion over the arrival of the first visitor 
(Rheya2) wears off, we see him decide that he ought not to accept his visitor as if 
she were Rheya. It has become clear to him that a miracle has not occurred: 
Rheya is not back from the dead. Instead, a copy has been created by an intelli-
gent alien force—a copy drawn from Kelvin’s own memories of his lost love. 
This copy is surely appealing to Kelvin as it is both physically accurate and psy-
chologically very similar to his wife (or at least his memories of his wife), but he 
can’t quite bring himself to ignore his knowledge that it isn’t really his wife after 
all. Thus, in a decision that comes quickly but nonetheless does not seem easy 
for him, he chooses to mislead her and eject her out into space.
It isn’t clear if, after the fact, Kelvin regrets this rather rash decision; when 
Snow asks him if he wants her to return, we just aren’t sure what Kelvin is 
thinking. With the arrival of Rheya3, however, his immediate willingness to 
bed down with her suggests at least some degree of acceptance. The degree of 
acceptance grows with time as he talks to her and sees her exhibit so many of 
the traits he remembers Rheya possessing. While viewers naturally sympathize 
with his deep desire to have a second chance and understand the strong psy-
chological pull he feels to embrace Rheya3 as his dead wife, as the film pro-
gresses his attachment comes to seem increasingly problematic. The ethical 
difficulties here are highlighted in a very direct fashion by Gordon when she at 
one point tells Kelvin, “She is not human. Try to understand that. [. . .] Your 
wife is dead. [.  .  .] She’s a copy—a facsimile, and she’s seducing you all over 
again. You’re sick!”
20 The inevitability of such an attraction is highlighted in the film through a careful emphasis on 
the role of touch. Shortly after a scene in which Rheya3 yells to Kelvin “Don’t touch me!” (see 
note 15) Kelvin says to Gordon, “What about your visitor . . . Does it feel? Can it touch? Does it 
speak?” (emphasis mine). Each of the two copies of Rheya on the ship greets Kelvin by first gently 
caressing his neck. The third copy of Rheya (on Solaris) also greets him with an embrace and then 
similarly strokes his neck. Though Soderbergh does not explicitly discuss these repetitions in the 
DVD commentary, he does at one point say, “I’m imagining that it is very hard to argue with the 
tactile sensation of her being next to you.” Note also that the original Rheya and Kelvin initially 
come together through holding hands on the elevator, and when the station is being absorbed by 
Solaris, Kelvin’s last act is to grasp the hand of Michael2 (Gibarian’s son).
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One explanation for the diagnosis that Kelvin is “sick” is that he seems, as 
time goes on, to have decided to take the easy way out and embrace a comforting 
illusion rather than expend the effort required to come to terms with the (moral 
and metaphysical) reality of his situation. His motives for yielding to this denial 
of the facts are no doubt complicated but appear increasingly ethically suspect: 
while he is surely motivated by a sincere longing and love for his late wife, he 
seems equally motivated by a misguided and self-centered attempt to use Rheya3 
as a vehicle to atone for his past sins to Rheya. Trying to undo the past by recreat-
ing the past with a copy, he appears more and more unhinged, both psychologi-
cally and morally, as the story unfolds.
That Gordon is on to something in her diagnosis of Kelvin’s state is emphasized 
by his interaction with Rheya3 as she reflects on and becomes increasingly aware of 
her dubious ontological status. Recognizing that she is not simply a copy of another 
person, but a copy of Kelvin’s (possibly distorted) memories of another person, she 
comes to question her potential for free choice and any sort of authentic existence:
rheya3: Don’t you see I came from your memory of her. That’s the 
 problem. I’m not a whole person. In your memory you get to  control 
everything. So, even if you remember something wrong, I am 
 predetermined to carry it out. I’m suicidal because that’s how you 
remember me.21
Kelvin, at this point disturbingly self-absorbed, responds:
I don’t believe that we’re predetermined to relive our past. I think we can 
choose to do it differently [. . .] This is my chance to undo that mistake . . . 
and I need you to help me.
Rheya3, in tears, exclaims, “But am I really Rheya?” and Kelvin responds, as if in 
a daze, “I don’t know anymore. All I see is you. . . . All I see is you.”22
Later Rheya3 suggests that in order for Kelvin and her to continue on, they 
“would have to have some sort of arrangement, some kind of unspoken under-
standing that I’m not really a human being.” Saying only, “No, Rheya,” he reaches 
21 Solaris has interesting thematic overlap with the 2004 film Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless 
Mind. In both we are presented with tales of lost love and second chances, and in both the female 
of the couple is presented to the viewer almost entirely as a projection based on the male charac-
ter’s memories of her. Solaris also seems to implicitly reference the classic film about love, loss, and 
projection: Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo.
22 To my mind this is an excellent example of someone failing (rather spectacularly!) to follow Iris 
Murdoch’s injunction to “really look”—to strive to perceive the reality of a situation accurately. Mur-
doch eloquently argued that such perception is demanded by both love and justice. For more on 
Murdoch’s conception of morality and love, see the contribution from Susan Wolf in this collection.
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for the red pills that will keep him awake and thus enable him to ensure she 
doesn’t attempt suicide. Rheya3 comes to reject this possibility of them staying 
together, saying, “This? What kind of life is this? Trapped here? It’s not a life, 
I don’t know what to call it.” Kelvin, at his most disturbing, replies, “It is what 
we have. It is enough for me.” By now Gordon’s earlier claim that Kelvin was 
“sick” seems an understatement. He naturally craves his lost love, and we can 
appreciate why he would desire some sort of redemption from her, but of course 
Rheya3 is not actually in a position to forgive Kelvin for his earlier abandon-
ment of Rheya, and while at some level he clearly knows this, he doesn’t seem to 
care—an imitation of forgiveness, from an imitation of Rheya, has come to 
seem acceptable to him. Thus my earlier charge of self-absorption: if he was 
really caring about Rheya at this point, he’d be sensitive enough to notice that 
she’s not there. If he really cared about the visitor, he’d be sensitive enough to 
notice that she isn’t Rheya (and is an autonomous individual). Since he isn’t rec-
ognizing the distinct identity of either, but instead blurring them, he is simulta-
neously disrespecting both. This willingness to indulge in fantasy and ignore 
Rheya3’s pleas is truly striking, and it is a testament to George Clooney’s sympa-
thetic portrayal of Kelvin that we don’t find him loathsome at this point.23
That Kelvin is disregarding Rheya3’s wishes, her autonomy, and her individu-
ality is patently clear. It is possible that one might try to excuse his behavior by 
pointing out that Rheya3 isn’t, after all, a human being and thus his violation 
here is not as morally problematic as a failure to respect the needs and desires of 
a real person.24 While I think this defense is misguided, rather than respond to 
it in detail with an argument in favor of Rheya3’s “humanity,” I want to instead 
focus again on the way in which Kelvin is also disregarding the memory of a very 
real person, his dead wife Rheya. What would the original Rheya have thought 
about Kelvin’s willingness to ignore the distinction between her and the visitors 
that appear to him? It seems likely that she would have been disturbed, and 
perhaps even disgusted, by his attempt to compensate for his failure to her 
23 Another reason why many viewers continue to interpret Kelvin sympathetically (and one rea-
son why, I think, this story works better on film than on the page) is that the viewers are, just like 
Kelvin, shown a woman who looks exactly like the original. “Seeing is believing,” as they say, and 
I think part of the pull to accept Rheya3 as Rheya comes from our instinctual trust in what we are 
shown on the screen. Reflecting on the situation after the fact, it is easier to recognize that Rheya3 
is indeed a fully distinct individual. (This same point will apply later to our initial willingness to 
trust that the Kelvin we see at the end is the original Kelvin.)
24 Another rather different sort of defense might focus on the wrongness of suicide and interpret 
Kelvin’s actions here as primarily motivated by a concern that Rheya3 not commit this wrong 
act. While I don’t want to deny that Kelvin may have this motivation, it seems quite clear at this 
point in the film that his primary motivations concern his desire to use Rheya3 in order to fulfill a 
misguided fantasy of moral redemption and lost love regained.
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through building a new life with a copy of her. (Think how you would feel about 
someone you love behaving in a similar matter toward a “copy” of you, i.e., refus-
ing to recognize that you and the copy are distinct individuals. You might come 
to forgive the person for this failure to acknowledge your individual identity, but 
such forgiveness in itself necessarily involves an acknowledgment of a signifi-
cant wrong on his or her part.) Kelvin’s descent into denial and fantasy involves 
not just mental illness but a morally troubling attitude of disregard toward the 
memory of the woman he so urgently claims to love.
The Ending
Perhaps luckily for her, Rheya3 does manage to destroy herself (with Gordon’s 
help) and Kelvin is left alone, forced to choose whether to try and return to 
Earth or stay on the ship as it is absorbed (and presumably destroyed) by the 
ever-growing Solaris. The structure of the film at this point deliberately misleads 
the viewer (at least on first viewing): we are led to infer initially that Kelvin 
chooses to return to Earth with Gordon, and we are shown several shots of him 
living out his daily life that very closely echo the shots that began the film. Only 
later are we shown footage that reveals that he in fact remained behind on the 
ship. What exactly occurs from that point on remains opaque, even after the 
credits roll. What is clear enough is that Kelvin (or someone just like him) is 
reunited with Rheya (or someone just like her) in an environment that looks 
just like Earth. However, the structure of the film and the final shots of the 
receding Solaris make it clear that this “Earth” is, in fact, Solaris.
One tempting interpretation of the ending of the film is to see it as offering 
a heartwarming tale of resurrection and redemption in an afterlife created by a 
sympathetic God-like intelligence.25 (The producer James Cameron, predict-
ably, pushes just such a cheery interpretation in the DVD commentary.)26 I 
think it is beyond doubt that we are supposed to initially consider such an out-
come, and surely part of the appeal of the ending for many viewers is this possi-
bility. Nevertheless, upon reflection, I think the most plausible interpretation of 
25 The inclusion of the Dylan Thomas poem and the focus on the line: “And death shall have no 
dominion” (derived from Romans 6:9) can obviously be taken to support a construal of the film’s 
ending as offering an optimistic vision of resurrection and reunion. An extended consideration of 
the poem is beyond the scope of this essay, but I take it that the poem, like the film, lends itself to 
both a superficially happy interpretation and, on reflection, a darker reading. Notably both Kelvin 
and Rheya agree that, in the end, it is “not a very happy poem.”
26 I say “predictably” here because there has traditionally been a strong commercial incentive for 
films to have “happy endings” and presumably Cameron, as producer, is in part motivated by such 
incentives. For a dismissive discussion of the film as offering a happy ending, see Vida Johnson 
and Graham Petrie, “Ethical Exploration,” Sight and Sound 13, no. 2 (February 2003): 17–18.
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the final sequences leaves matters decidedly more nuanced and unsettled. Here 
I’ll try to make the case that the most reasonable reading of the film is one in 
which we take seriously the possibility that the Kelvin we see in the last sequences 
of the film is not, in fact, the original Kelvin but some new creature created by 
Solaris and probably based (like the other “visitors”) on memories. If this is 
right, then a straightforward reading of the ending as one involving everlasting 
life and reunion with a lost love is far too simplistic.
What are the reasons for thinking we should conclude that the Kelvin we see 
at the end of the film is best construed as Kelvin2 rather than a magically 
enhanced and now immortal Kelvin? First off, the absorption of the space sta-
tion by Solaris presumably destroys the necessary life-support mechanisms on 
the ship and would cause any remaining humans to die. We see Kelvin in great 
pain and apparently close to death when he encounters Michael2 (the copy of 
Gibarian’s son). Though we don’t clearly see Kelvin die, it is plausible to assume 
he does. That his final pose resembles Michelangelo’s painting The Creation of 
Adam suggests that what we will encounter next will indeed be some kind of 
significantly new creation.
Since we eventually learn that Kelvin did not go back to Earth with Gor-
don, we can safely conclude that the “Earth” we see Kelvin “return” to is actu-
ally a recreation of Earth on Solaris. The Rheya who appears is also, presumably, 
a recreation. It makes sense, then, that Kelvin is also a recreation at this point. 
His body’s ability to instantly heal the cut on his finger certainly suggests this 
idea. (We already know that the visitors can heal themselves, and we know that 
the creation of a brand new Kelvin is entirely within Solaris’s powers, for we 
have learned that the original Snow was killed by a Solaris-created copy of 
himself.)
Consider also that Kelvin’s monologue (delivered as a voice-over) about 
returning to Earth takes on a different and perhaps more comprehensible tone 
if we imagine it being uttered by a duplicate Kelvin trying to make sense of his 
new existence and situation27:
27 The shots that appear while this monologue is being delivered mirror shots we see at the begin-
ning of the film, but there are subtle yet important differences. In all these later shots we get a 
distinct impression of distance that is not present in the early versions. With the camera being 
further away, sometimes at a different height, and usually in motion, the suggestion seems to be 
that the camera now represents the point of view of a removed intelligence monitoring Kelvin. 
In contrast, the earlier scenes are either shot in such a way as to align us with Kelvin or are shot 
in a traditional “transparent” style. To my mind, the distancing present in these later sequences 
further suggests the idea that what we are looking at in these scenes may not be Kelvin but instead 
yet another creation of Solaris. The style of these shots is a subtle indicator that perhaps we, as 
viewers, should also be distancing ourselves from this man. It helps push us to not be complacent 
with a superficial interpretation of the film that would suggest an all-too-happy ending to this 
nuanced and melancholy story.
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Earth. Even the word sounded strange to me now. Unfamiliar. How long 
had I been gone? How long had I been back? Did it matter? I tried to 
find the rhythm of the world where I used to live . . . I followed the cur-
rent. I was silent, attentive, I made a conscious effort to smile, nod, stand, 
and perform the million of gestures that constitute life on earth. I stud-
ied these gestures until they became reflexes again, but I was haunted by 
the idea that I remembered her wrong. That somehow I was wrong about 
everything . . .
The need to study and practice basic gestures is not entirely surprising if in fact 
he is some sort of a recreation or duplication of the original Kelvin. (Recall the 
somewhat odd behavior of Snow2 as he struggles throughout the film to accu-
rately portray the original Snow.) Kelvin’s worry that he “was wrong about 
everything” may well include a worry about the nature of his own existence at 
this point.
In addition, it is worth remembering the dream visitation of Gibarian and 
his cryptic comments to Kelvin about puppets (“Who am I then? A puppet? 
And you’re not. Or maybe you’re my puppet? But like all puppets you think you 
are actually humans . . . It’s the puppet’s dream, being human.”). With this speech 
in mind, note the mildly odd and artificial stance of Kelvin once he notices 
Rheya and walks over to her in the final sequence of the film. The somewhat 
unnatural posture of his arms in this scene brings to mind the image of a mari-
onette: a puppet held up by strings and manipulated by someone above. Of 
course, if he is in fact a creation of Solaris at this point, a puppet metaphor is not 
far off.
Finally, while it may be tempting to interpret the film as telling an uplifting 
spiritual tale of resurrection in an afterlife, it is important to keep in mind that 
throughout the film various characters emphasize that Solaris is an entirely alien 
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sort of intelligence, and attributing benevolent motives to it is little more than a 
leap of faith given that it has not communicated any such intentions to those 
members of humanity it has thus far interacted with. Perhaps it seeks to give Kel-
vin everlasting life, and perhaps it has the ability to do this, but it is just as possible 
that it is merely experimenting with his memory blueprint for its own, mysterious 
aims.28 After all, Solaris did not seem to show benevolence in confronting Snow 
with a copy of himself, or Gibarian with a copy of his son (while his son is still alive 
back on Earth!), and though we never find out who Gordon’s visitor was, it is safe 
to assume (given her response) that it was not a welcome guest. To suggest that 
Solaris nevertheless has created an afterlife for Kelvin and Rheya as an act of love is 
to make the alien planet into a disturbingly fickle God. It is much more plausible, 
given all that we are shown, to conclude that the ending represents something 
significantly less comforting than the traditional conception of Heaven.
Parfit and the “Unimportance of Identity”
I’ve suggested that we should resist the temptation to see Solaris as presenting 
an unambiguously happy ending and instead consider that the ending of 
this film is actually fairly disturbing once we reflect on the possibility that the 
“reunion” we see is, in fact, the coming together of two newly created creatures 
who possess merely apparent memories derived from the genuine memories of a 
real human who has perished. However, there is yet another rather different way 
to make sense of the ending, given the interpretation of the film I’ve offered 
28 Given that toward the end of the film Kelvin seems to have decided to accept an illusion and 
stop recognizing the distinct reality of Rheya3, it is ironic that at the very end of the film he too 
appears to be a duplicate. It is as if Solaris, far from feeling benevolent, has decided to deliver just 
deserts: if a copy is good enough for Kelvin, then why shouldn’t a copy of Kelvin be good enough 
as well?
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here. One could challenge the presupposition that we can coherently mark off 
the identities of these various entities—one could question the very reality of 
the self. If the boundaries of the self are in some sense illusory, then perhaps the 
ending of the film represents as genuine a reunion as is ever possible, and per-
haps a cheerier response to the ending is justified. I want to conclude by sketch-
ing out this rather radical possibility through borrowing some ideas from 
philosopher Derek Parfit.
In discussing questions of personal identity and attachment, Parfit has rec-
ognized that many people would be reluctant to allow the replacement of a 
loved one with a duplicate—he admits that we often attach to persons in a way 
that can’t be understood solely through reference to their qualities. Regardless 
of whether we naturally tend to attach to persons in this manner, he argues that 
we are nonetheless better off if we come to love in a more reasonable way. Con-
sidering the fictional case of a woman named Mary Smith who creates a dupli-
cate of herself using a replicating device, he says:
I fall in love with Mary Smith. How should I react after she has first used 
the Replicator? I claim both that I would and that I ought to love her 
Replica. This is not the “ought” of morality. On the best conception of 
the best kind of love, I ought to love this individual. She is fully psycho-
logically continuous with the Mary Smith I loved, and she has an exactly 
similar body. If I do not love Mary Smith’s Replica, this could only be for 
one of several bad reasons.[. . .] The remaining explanation is that my love 
has ceased for no reason. No reason is a bad reason. Love can cease like 
this, but only an inferior kind of love.29
The duplicate or replicated Mary has everything about Mary that one could 
reasonably love: she has the same personality, an exactly similar body, and even 
qualitatively identical memories (or “quasi-memories,” as Parfit calls them). 
What’s not to like, or in this case, love?
Parfit understands that few will be inclined to accept this revision, but he 
thinks this is because most of us hold, either explicitly or implicitly, confused 
29 Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 295–296. Note 
that this passage comes in the context of Parfit defending the more limited point that loving 
a “series-person” is reasonable. In the end, however, his position commits him to denying the 
importance of the identity of a loved one even in our world (and not just a world where series-
persons are common), and thus accepting replaceability as rationally appropriate. This is because 
Parfit argues (in Reasons and Persons) not just that identity does not matter, but that what does 
matter are psychological relations with any cause, and a duplicate possesses these psychological re-
lations (albeit through an abnormal cause) (287). (I also discuss this passage from Parfit in “Love 
and History,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 48, no. 3.)
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metaphysical beliefs. Most of us think that the identity of a person is some sort 
of “deep further fact” over and above the psychological and physical relations 
that make up a person.30 Parfit provides several intriguing thought experiments 
that are supposed to bolster his claim that identity cannot rationally have the 
importance we normally grant it. Perhaps his most effective argument relies on 
an example (derived from David Wiggins) in which we imagine one person 
splitting into two. Here is a brief reconstruction of that “fission” thought 
experiment:
 
 1. It is commonly accepted that a person can survive a hemispherectomy. In 
other words, people have survived operations in which an entire hemisphere 
of one’s brain is removed. While the surviving person may be changed 
in very significant ways, we don’t consider the person to be numerically 
distinct from the original person who chose to undergo the procedure.31 
(Your thought going into such a procedure is not, presumably, that you 
will be destroyed by the operation and replaced by another less functional 
person. Rather, you would anticipate surviving as a less functional version 
of oneself.)
 2. It is also commonly accepted that if one’s brain could be transplanted into 
a different body, the person would go where the brain goes. In other words, 
our brains are essential to our identity in a manner in which the rest of our 
body is not. (Thus the plausibility of “brain in a vat” scenarios we see and 
accept in so much science fiction.)
 3. Given 1 and 2, we can assume that if it were possible to, say, destroy one 
hemisphere of a person’s brain and transplant the remaining hemisphere 
into a new (but similar) body, the resulting person (in the new body) 
would be numerically identical to the original person that existed prior to 
this procedure. In other words, the survival of half of your brain (put into a 
new but functional body) is enough to constitute your survival. (It does not 
follow that this is a happy state of affairs—merely that it is a state of affairs 
in which you have not ceased to exist.)
 4. Consider now a variation on the scenario described in 3: Rather than de-
stroy one hemisphere, imagine that we take your brain and transplant each 
30 Ibid., 210.
31 Numerical identity is being contrasted here with qualitative identity. While the person who ex-
ists after the operation will not be qualitatively identical to the previous person, as many of his or 
her qualities will have changed, he will still be numerically identical in the sense that he is one and 
the same person who chose to undergo the procedure. Philosophers discussing personal identity 
are usually focusing on numerical (rather than qualitative) identity. It is this sense of identity that 
is being analyzed by Parfit.
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hemisphere into two new (but similar) bodies. In the case of this “fission,” 
which resulting person is you? There seem to be only three possibilities: 
(A) You do not survive. (B) You survive as one of two people. (C) You 
survive as both.
 5. None of these possibilities is satisfactory. Consider each in turn: (A) How 
could a double success be a failure? (B) Which one? Choosing either as 
the survivor seems arbitrary. (C) This seems nonsensical. Survival involves 
identity, and I cannot be identical (numerically) with more than one 
thing.
 6. Though we know all the relevant information, we seem unable to come up 
with a determinate answer to the question of your identity in such a case.
 
As the fission example shows, there are puzzles involving personal identity 
that raise questions to which we have no idea how to answer. Parfit thinks that 
such cases cannot be easily answered because they have no clearly correct answer. 
Our criteria for identity do not cover every conceivable case—there are situa-
tions in which they are incomplete and come apart. We readily accept that this 
can happen for concepts such as “table” or “nation”—the indeterminacy of our 
criteria for the identity of such things doesn’t disturb us. Cases involving per-
sonal identity are importantly different, however. We often feel they must have 
an answer. How could there not be a “yes” or “no” answer to the question of 
whether the person possessing my body tomorrow will be me? We tend to think 
that no matter what occurs between now and then, the resulting person either 
must be me or must not be me. In other words, we think there must be some 
determinate answer, even if we don’t currently know what it is. Parfit argues that 
we should give up this belief, and further, that we should “give up the language 
of identity.”32 (After all, the fission case shows that we can have a situation in 
which, at the end, what does matter is present, but numerical identity is absent.) 
According to Parfit, what actually matters in survival comes in relations of 
degree (i.e., physical and/or psychological continuity and connectedness). Per-
sonal identity in itself (which is “all or nothing”) doesn’t matter. A person is like 
a nation—what matters are the parts.
It is natural to believe that there is some further fact about our identity that 
decides all possible cases (thus we posit the existence of a mysterious soul or 
mental substance), and it is also natural to believe this must be a rather deep fact 
about us. Parfit denies that there is any such fact. Surprisingly, he does not see 
this as a depressing conclusion:
32 Derek Parfit, “Personal Identity,” in Personal Identity, ed. John Perry (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1975), 203.
1 1 8 u n d e r s t a n d i n g  l o v e
OUP  UNCORRECTED PROOF
WOLF-Chapter 05-PageProof 118 August 1, 2013 11:46 AM
Is the truth depressing? Some may find it so. But I find it liberating and 
consoling. When I believed my existence was such a further fact, I seemed 
imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I 
was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. 
When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now 
live in the open air. (281)
Parfit argues that only the existence of some deep further fact would give me a 
reason to be specially concerned about my future. In the absence of this fact, 
mere personal (numerical) identity gives me no such reason. To put it bluntly, 
self-interest becomes absurd without a self.33 Further, an attachment to the iden-
tity of another individual (such as a friend or lover) is also, on this view, simi-
larly problematic.34
At the end of Solaris we see someone who looks like Kelvin asking some-
one who looks like Rheya, “Am I alive or am I dead?” He may well just be 
wondering if he’s alive back on Earth or instead in something like Heaven. 
Given the subtleties of the film, and the peculiarities of the situation he finds 
himself in, however, I think it is plausible to take him to be asking (or at least 
groping toward) a more disturbing question: is he the original Kelvin (back 
on Earth) or is he instead a copy of Kelvin (in some simulated world)? (Cer-
tainly this is a question that we are inclined to ask about him at this point.) 
We have now seen, however, that a Parfitian need not accept this sort of ques-
tion as legitimate. There may be no justifiable distinction to draw between 
being the “original” Kelvin and being a “copy,” for such a distinction relies on 
a notion of identity that, according to Parfit, lacks the importance we nor-
mally grant it. Similarly, Parfit’s conclusions suggest that our earlier concerns 
over whether Kelvin was recognizing the distinct identities of the Rheya visi-
tors may also have been misguided. If identity doesn’t matter, then the draw-
ing of lines marking off the individual identities of the various Rheyas is 
33 Admittedly, this phrasing puts things more strongly than Parfit does. He prefers to characterize 
his position as a version of “constitutive reductionism” rather than “eliminative reductionism.” 
Parfit doesn’t deny that selves (in some sense) exist, but he does deny that this existence has the 
importance we ordinarily grant it. Cf. “Is Personal Identity What Matters?” (2007).
34 Effective criticisms of Parfit’s approach toward identity can be found in the writings of Mark 
Johnston. See in particular “Human Beings,” The Journal of Philosophy (1987) and “Reasons and 
Reductionism” in Reading Parfit, ed. by Jonathan Dancy (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 
1997). While I think Johnston’s arguments are successful, it should be noted that many contem-
porary philosophers have followed Parfit in rejecting the idea that identity can have importance 
in itself. Among those who agree (more or less) with Parfit on this issue are Sidney Shoemaker, 
John Perry, Carol Rovane, Jennifer Whiting, and Anthony Q uinton. Parfit has also claimed that 
the Buddha held something close to his view.
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wrongheaded. The question, “Is Rheya3 identical to Rheya1?” may be as point-
less and arbitrary as asking the question, “Do I still have one and the same 
audio system?” after I have chosen to replace some but not all of my audio 
components.35 When we encounter situations that stretch the limits of the 
criteria we have for the use of a concept, we can end up with genuine indeter-
minacy. In cases where there is no determinate answer to be uncovered, all we 
can do is choose to adopt or create an answer by convention. We find ourselves 
in a position where we might say, echoing Gibarian, “There are no answers. 
Only choices.”
If we accept both the occasional indeterminacy and the ultimate unimpor-
tance of personal identity, the ending of Solaris takes on a very different flavor. 
Kelvin’s question about his own identity is given what can now be recognized as 
a thoroughly Parfitian response by Rheya: to give up the language of identity is 
indeed to recognize that “We don’t have to think like that anymore.”36 Here are 
Parfit’s own comments on how his approach can allow him to deny that death 
has dominion:
After a certain time, none of the thoughts and experiences that occur will 
be directly causally related to this brain, or be connected in certain ways 
to these present experiences. That is all this fact involves. And, in that 
redescription, my death seems to disappear.37
Following Parfit, Kelvin can free himself from the pseudo-problem of his iden-
tity and instead embrace both Rheya and the situation they now find themselves 
in. Free from ontological concerns, they are finally able to realize Rheya’s earlier 
ambition to “just live inside that feeling [of love] forever.”
What of Rheya’s final proclamation to Kelvin regarding forgiveness? Inter-
estingly, that too can be given a Parfitian reading. Parfit points out that his proj-
ect of attacking the traditional notion of the self provides compelling grounds 
for suspecting that the equally traditional notions of desert and punishment 
should also be rejected.38 If the locus of responsible agency (i.e., the self ) does 
not have the robust reality we naturally take it to have, then perhaps the whole 
35 This example is offered by Parfit in “The Unimportance of Identity” in Personal Identity, eds. 
Raymond Martin and John Barresi (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 301.
36 In keeping with the Parfitian spirit of this section, from this point on I drop the use of subscripts 
to identify the various versions of Kelvin and Rheya.
37 Derek Parfit, “The Unimportance of Identity” in Personal Identity, eds. Raymond Martin and 
John Barresi (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 317.
38 Derek Parfit, “Comments,” Ethics 96 (1986): 832–872.
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idea of moral responsibility ought to be jettisoned. If this is right, then there is 
indeed a sense in which, as Rheya says, “everything we’ve done is forgiven.”39
Conclusion
I’ve been interested in two tensions elicited by Solaris. One tension arises once we 
start to think about how best to make sense of the plot. The film, particularly the 
ending, is ambiguous. Given that a primary theme of the film is the unknowabil-
ity of the alien intelligence that is Solaris, I think this ambiguity is appropriate—
an ending in which we knew exactly what was going on would (arguably) not 
resonate as well with the idea of Solaris as deeply inscrutable and alien. By the end 
of the film, though things are ambiguous, they are not entirely obscure, and what 
I have tried to show is that the film gains some of its force from the pull it creates 
between rival interpretations.
There is the pull to interpret the film as one with a conventional and happy 
Hollywood ending, and a superficial reading of the ending allows us to see Kel-
vin as gaining entrance to something like Heaven while being reunited with his 
lost love. There is also the pull to interpret the film as offering something darker 
and significantly less conventional. Keeping in mind that the director started 
out as an “indie” auteur and the source material is both melancholy and com-
plex, we can look for more than standard Hollywood fare here, and if we look 
closely we will indeed see a film in which the ending is quite nuanced and poten-
tially disturbing.
I don’t think this tension is due simply to an unhappy compromise arising 
from the conflicts between an auteur and a major studio (i.e., between art and 
commerce). As I mentioned before, I think the film is quite deliberately ambig-
uous. More specifically, I think there is a way in which the narration is, to use 
George Wilson’s phrase, “rhetorically unreliable.” Consider Wilson’s comments 
on You Only Live Once:
The spectator is led to draw conclusions from parts and aspects of what 
he sees even though the screen equally displays information that, taken 
together with the general knowledge of the probabilities of the actual 
world, ought to serve to undercut some of the prompted inferences.40
39 Though admittedly the sense here is not the standard one (which presupposes the existence of 
genuine moral responsibility). Instead, here the idea would be that they have discovered there is 
nothing to forgive since no culpable wrongdoing is, in fact, possible. (Thanks to David Cockburn 
for pushing me to emphasize this point.)
40 Wilson, George M. Narration in Light: Studies in Cinematic Point of View (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1988), 42.
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Supplement his talk here of “general knowledge of the probabilities of the actual 
world” with something like our general knowledge of criteria for identity, and 
you end up with a description that I think fits this film pretty well.
Focusing on the issues of identity and attachment, as I have tried to do, we 
can see that our initial temptation to grant benevolent motives to both Kelvin 
and Solaris needs to be tempered by an appreciation of the actual facts presented 
to us: Kelvin isn’t asking his wife for forgiveness; he’s using a copy of his wife to 
try and get past his guilt. Solaris isn’t a loving, God-like force; it is instead an 
inscrutable alien being whose motives remain mysterious and seem to be, at 
best, amoral.
This tension regarding how to best interpret the narrative is related to and 
informed by a distinct tension elicited by the film concerning the focus of 
attachment when we love. The film naturally evokes contemplation on the com-
plexities of love; in particular it encourages us to consider the nature of love’s 
bond. The far-fetched scenario presented to us resonates with very ordinary ten-
sions we can feel when we ourselves love. I have argued that with the character 
of Kelvin we see a good person go bad (or at least go ill) in deciding to ignore 
important moral distinctions between individuals in order to satisfy a very 
strong emotional thirst. The interpretation of the film I’ve offered is also com-
patible with rather different philosophical approaches to questions of attach-
ment and identity, however, and I’ve tried to show how, in particular, a Parfitian 
vision fits surprisingly well with the final moments of the film. I’m not a Parfi-
tian, so I’m inclined to continue to see the film’s resolution as less than heart-
warming. I think a Parfitian perspective is worthy of consideration, however, 
and the fact that film can be rewardingly construed along such lines is an addi-
tional reason why this complex, ambitious, and ambiguous film merits our 
attention.
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